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The Kindness of Psychopaths
Zdenka Brzović, Marko Jurjako, and Predrag Šustar
Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka
ABSTRACT
Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The
idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and
interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal and
clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought
to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We
frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’
designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We
argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an
affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine
three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could
eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more
encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy
as it is currently conceptualised. We argue that while a revision of
the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and
theoretical advancements, we also emphasise its role in clinical
and forensic research, which makes it an important pragmatic kind.
1. Introduction
Psychopathy is a personality disorder that most notably involves a diminished sense of guilt,
remorse and empathy. Other characterisations involve fearlessness, impulsivity and prone-
ness to risky and gratifying behaviour. In addition, the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy
include failure to make long-term plans, behaving irresponsibly and disregard for social
norms (Hare 2003). In recent decades, we are witnessing an increasing interest in the scien-
tific study of psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005; Patrick 2006; Glenn and Raine
2014) as well as investigations on the appropriate social response to psychopathic offenders
(e.g. Malatesti and McMillan 2010; Caldwell and Van Rybroek 2013).
The classification of certain individuals as psychopaths is at the core of important
scientific and related normative discussions. Whether the construct of psychopathy
picks out a unified phenomenon is a matter of substantial theoretical and empirical
debate among scientists who are investigating this condition (Skeem et al. 2011; Brazil
et al. 2016). Moreover, psychopathy has figured prominently in many recent philosophi-
cal and applied debates. For instance, some authors have argued that the existence of
psychopaths might have implications for the nature of moral judgement and other
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issues in metaethics (Prinz 2006; Sinnott-Armstrong 2014; Kumar 2016). As for the
practical repercussions, some authors have argued that scientific research warrants
diminished legal or moral accountability for individuals falling under the category of
psychopathy (Malatesti and McMillan 2010; see also Jalava and Griffiths 2017). Further-
more, some have argued that psychopathy should be considered as a mental illness
(Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013) or even that psychopaths should not be
included as full-fledged members (with all the relevant moral and legal rights) into
our society (e.g. Gaus 2011, 210, 282–283).
Arguably, these debates are not explicitly committed to the view that psychopathy is a
natural kind. Still, the question whether psychopathy is a natural kind bears weight on
these debates, because, in one way or another, they presuppose that psychopathy presents
a sufficiently unified phenomenon warranting sound inductive generalisations about
people so classified. In fact, despite mixed evidence on the unity of the construct ‘in
most clinical and legal contexts psychopathy is instead construed and assessed as if it
were a single thing: a homogeneous diagnostic category underpinned by a single causal
process’ (Skeem et al. 2011, 115).
In this article, we proceed as follows: in the next section, we introduce cluster approaches
to natural kinds. In section 3, we offer a more elaborate description of the category of psy-
chopathy and some prominent measures of it. In section 4, we evaluate the hypothesis that
psychopathy might be a natural kind on the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) and the
stable property cluster (SPC) accounts. We examine the claim that psychopathy is a syn-
drome comprised of highly correlated traits and argue that, despite there being studies indi-
cating that psychopathic traits significantly correlate, there is insufficient evidence that they
comprise an SPC kind. In addition, we consider whether psychopathy is underpinned by a
characteristic causal aetiology. We argue that the lack of success in establishing specific and
well-delineated aetiology or biomarkers for psychopathy indicates that psychopathy in the
current stage of research cannot be considered an HPC kind. Thus, we argue that the con-
struct of psychopathy denotes a heterogeneous category that has limited theoretical utility.
In section 5, we investigate what is the appropriate methodological response to such a
situation. We examine three options: (1) revising the category of psychopathy; (2) elimi-
nating it; or (3) abandoning the cluster approach to natural kinds. We argue against the
last two options. We argue that option (1) is likely to advance future research on psycho-
pathy. However, in section 6, we indicate that the need for revision of the category does
not necessarily entail that the category ought to be eliminated, at least not until a suitable
alternative becomes available. We offer a more general discussion of how to accommodate
the current state of psychopathy research. The category of psychopathy is at least pragma-
tically important because it provides a framework for clinical and forensic research. Thus,
we indicate how treating psychopathy as a pragmatic kind can account for its status at the
current stage of research.
2. Natural Kinds in the Biomedical Sciences and Psychiatry
Essentialism is a traditional approach to natural kinds—that conceives them as groupings
of things that share a set of common characteristic properties (essences). The essence is
supposed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for kind membership. However, essen-
tialism about natural kinds is inadequate as a description of kinds in many disciplines,
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especially, in the biomedical sciences, where strict divisions into categories as required by
essentialism are often impossible (Dupré 1993).
One possible reaction is to conclude that there are no natural kinds in the biomedical
and social sciences. However, the downside of this approach is that it appears to be utterly
uninformative; in fact, disciplines, such as psychiatry, utilise classifications and the ques-
tion what makes some of those classifications better, i.e. more successful, closer to the ‘real’
groupings of properties in nature, seems to be a valid one (Murphy 2006, ch. 7). In fact,
many philosophers of psychiatry agree that real mental disorders are natural kinds (Beebee
and Sabbarton-Leary 2010). For instance, Richard Samuels (2009) argues that delusions,
while Jonathan Tsou (2013, 2016) argues that schizophrenia, depression, and even
suicide are natural kinds.
However, these authors usually adopt a more inclusive view of natural kinds. According
to an influential account, natural kinds are clusters of co-occurring properties unified by
casual homeostatic mechanisms (Boyd 1991, 1999). These mechanisms are responsible for
the clustering of properties that ground inductive generalisations about kind members. In
the philosophy of science, properties that ground inductive inferences are called projecti-
ble properties. These properties, in turn, enable us to systematically classify and predict the
behaviour of kind members. One important distinction is between the mechanisms and
causes that are intrinsic and those that are extrinsic to the members of the kind. For
instance, in the case of biological species, extrinsic mechanisms or causes such as inter-
breeding, common ancestry and shared ecological niche are important, because they
cause shared intrinsic, i.e. genetic and developmental properties that are responsible for
the observable phenotypic traits. Inclusion of extrinsic or relational mechanisms or prop-
erties is a novelty introduced by HPC, which makes it suitable for classifications in the life
sciences.
The search for homeostatic mechanisms can be related to the search for aetiologies of
different disorders or conditions in psychiatry and related fields. In this respect, there are
various levels and types of explanation of interest (Kendler, Zachar, and Craver 2011). One
type of explanation may invoke distal factors that go back in evolutionary history, or more
proximal causes such as genetic and/or environmental processes underlying certain dis-
orders. When we talk about shared intrinsic properties, we invoke brain states as the
best candidate for the scientific grounding of certain behaviours and actions. Depending
on howmany of these features are shared and howmuch we know about the underpinning
mechanisms, our explanations and predictions invoking such categories will have a higher
or lower degree of reliability.
Many philosophers of psychiatry have endorsed the HPC account as suitable for
accommodating psychiatric categories (e.g. Samuels 2009; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary
2010; Kendler, Zachar, and Craver 2011). A reason for HPC’s popularity is that it captures
well the actual practice of classification across sciences. Boyd’s view is also widely endorsed
in the more general debates on classification in the philosophy of science (Ereshefsky and
Reydon 2015), and is applied in many scientific areas (e.g. Feldman Barrett 2006; Tsou
2013; Murphy 2014).
There are, however, several objections to the HPC account. For instance, Muhammad
Khalidi (2013) claims that the demand for underlying homeostatic mechanisms is too
strong. Nevertheless, he maintains that a causal account of natural kinds is a correct
one, where some common causes account for the similarities of kind members.
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Matthew Slater (2015) further argues that it is enough that there are clusters of stable prop-
erties (SPC), and that we should not worry about the underlying causes of such stability.
On this view, roughly, clusters of properties are stable if instantiation of some of them war-
rants a probabilistically reliable inference to the instantiation of other properties (Slater
2015, sec. 5; see also note 8 below). In our case, this would mean that psychopathy is a
kind if observations of some psychopathic traits probabilistically entail the presence of
others. Unfortunately, Slater does not provide reliability thresholds for probabilistic entail-
ments that could be directly applied to the classification of psychopathy. He claims that
depending on a scientific field, this might be contextually determined (Slater 2015,
n. 29). In section 4, we indicate what would ground a reliable inference relevant for our
discussion.
Here, we do not adjudicate between the proposed accounts of natural kinds. We main-
tain that clustering accounts of natural kinds (whether it is HPC or the more encompass-
ing SPC account) are appropriate for psychiatric categorisations (Kendler, Zachar, and
Craver 2011; Murphy 2014). Furthermore, HPC seems to account for the way in which
many researchers conceptualise the construct of psychopathy (see section 4 here). We
acknowledge, however, that there are useful and interesting examples of psychiatric cat-
egories that cannot be captured by the clustering accounts, as will be shown with the
case of psychopathy (for a taxonomy of classifications in psychiatry, see Haslam 2002).
With regard to such cases, it appears that a reconceptualisation of the category is in
order, but the question remains how to proceed in the scientific inquiry before a better
alternative gains prominence. In the case of psychopathy, we propose to conceptualise
it as a pragmatic kind.
In the next section, we introduce in more detail the construct of psychopathy. Then in
sections 4 and 5, we discuss whether psychopathy as currently conceptualised should be
considered a natural kind according to cluster views.
3. The Psychopathy Construct
As already noted, many researchers take psychopathy to be a scientifically robust concept
since it denotes a set of traits consistently found across individuals, cultures and ethnic
groups (Cooke 1998). Psychopathy is associated with extreme antisocial behaviour and
characteristic emotional and interpersonal traits (Table 1). These traits distinguish it
Table 1. PCL-R items (Hare 2003).
Factor 1 Factor 2
Facet 1: Interpersonal traits Facet 3: Lifestyle traits
1. Glibness/Superficial charm 3. Need for stimulation
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth 9. Parasitic lifestyle
4. Pathological lying 13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals
5. Conning/Manipulative 14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
Facet 2: Affective traits Facet 4: Antisocial traits
6. Lack of remorse or guilt 10. Poor behavioural controls
7. Shallow affect 12. Early behavioural problems
8. Callous/Lack of empathy 18. Juvenile delinquency
16. Failure to accept responsibility 19. Revocation of conditional release
20. Criminal versatility
Items not belonging to any of the facets:
11. Promiscuous sexual behaviour, 17. Many short-term marital relationships
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from a more general Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) as registered in different edi-
tions of the Diagnostic-Statistical Manual (DSM). In the latest (5th) edition of DSM
(American Psychiatric Association 2013, DSM V), however, ASPD has been revised and
now it is also defined by interpersonal and affective traits, which makes it closer to con-
temporary conceptualisations of psychopathy (Strickland et al. 2013). Nevertheless, psy-
chopathy is still not explicitly recognised as a personality disorder in DSM V, and thus
we should be careful not to conflate these two constructs (Brazil and Cima 2016).
Modern conceptualisations of psychopathy are largely based on Hervey Cleckley’s
(1976) seminal work. He made a list of psychopathic traits based on his clinical practice
and interviews with different types of disturbed individuals. In his book, The Mask of
Sanity, he provides a ‘clinical profile’ of a typical psychopath. Robert Hare (2003) intro-
duced the Psychopathy checklist (PCL and the later revised versions PCL-R, see
Table 1) to operationalise Checkley’s ‘clinical profile’ for research. PCL-R is widely used
for diagnosing psychopathy in prison and other institutionalised settings. It also serves
as a unifying tool for empirical, theoretical and practical research on psychopathy (Mala-
testi and McMillan 2014). As such, it is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ for psychopathy
research.
By using PCL-R, individuals are assessed on 20 items via semi-structured interviews
and intensive study of their history (mostly, the prison records).1 Scores range from 0
to 2. The cut-off value for being a psychopath is 30 in North America, while in Europe,
it is 25.2 However, the appropriate cut-score is pragmatically determined. For instance,
if it has practical consequences for a person involved (e.g. risk assessment or treatment
options) then Hare suggests using higher cut-scores, while for research purposes he
suggests that using lower scores might be appropriate (Hare 2003, 30–31).
Early statistical analyses of PCL-R indicated that some items are more correlated than
others. For instance, people scoring high on pathological lying also score high on the
conning/manipulative item. Similarly, scoring high on lack of remorse is correlated
with scoring high on callous/lack of empathy. Factors in statistical analysis represent
groupings of items that are significantly correlated with each other. Based on such corre-
lations, Hare (2003) accepts the division of PCL-R items into two factors, which further
divide into 4 facets (Table 1). Factor 1 groups together interpersonal and affective
traits, while Factor 2 captures lifestyle and antisocial traits.
The virtues of the PCL-R also hinder its application to general populations.3 PCL-R
relies on accessing files of subjects’ histories and extensive interviews, which are not
always available, especially when studying non-forensic populations. Thus, with general
populations, alternative measures are often used.
One widely used tool is the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Fowler and
Lilienfeld 2013). The PPI is a self-report measure originally consisting of 187 items. Simi-
larly, to PCL-R, the items can be divided into two broad factors. Fearlessness-dominance
(FD) factor includes Social Potency, Fearlessness, and Stress Immunity. These include
traits such as absence of anxiety, willingness to take risks, and skill at influencing
others. Antisocial-impulsivity (AI) factor comprises Machiavellian Egocentricity, Impul-
sive Nonconformity, Blame Externalisation, and Carefree Nonplanfulness. These
include traits such as lack of concern for the social norms, attitude of indifference
towards future, and ‘a ruthless willingness to manipulate and take advantage of others’
(Fowler and Lilienfeld 2013, 44). Some psychometric analyses have indicated convergent
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validity between PPI and PCL-R (Poythress et al. 2010, 10). Thus, it is thought that FD
corresponds to Factor 1, while AI corresponds to Factor 2 of PCL-R.
4. Is Psychopathy a Natural Kind?
Although, as far as we are aware, ‘natural kinds’ language is not used in the psychopathy
research, an important group of authors accepts that psychopathy satisfies the cluster
approach criteria for kindhood. In psychology and the biomedical sciences, the notion
of syndrome is usually used to designate a constellation of correlated symptoms. When
the symptoms are highly correlated, it is thought that they are underpinned by a
common cause. If a condition is comprised of weakly correlated symptoms, then it is
assumed that the symptoms stem from heterogeneous causes (Feldman Barrett 2006,
33; Lilienfeld 2013, 85). In the vocabulary of natural kinds, a constellation of highly cor-
related symptoms would correspond to a projectible property cluster, and the assumption
of common aetiology to a sustaining cause. Many psychopathy research groups think of
psychopathy as a syndrome (for a review, see Hamilton, Racer, and Newman 2015). As
a paradigmatic example, James Blair and colleagues claim that psychopathy comprises a
projectible overlapping cluster of emotional and interpersonal traits underpinned by
specific neurocognitive mechanisms (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005, 7, 15).
In what follows, first, we examine whether psychopathy is a syndrome comprised of
highly correlated traits. Secondly, we survey two main alternative hypotheses regarding
the underlying causes of psychopathy. Thirdly, we discuss attempts to delineate psycho-
pathy with neurobiological markers.
4.1. Psychopathy as a Stable Property Cluster
Psychopathic personality traits are relatively stable across time (Glenn and Raine 2014,
23), but this temporal stability is not sufficient for considering it a natural kind. On the
SPC account, stability refers to reliable inferences from observations of certain features
to instantiations of other features (Slater 2015). In the psychological research, this claim
translates into correlations. Namely, the higher the correlation between traits, the
higher the probability that the traits are co-instantiated. A high correlation indicates the
existence of a discrete category or taxon. Thus, according to Feldman Barret, a ‘way to
establish the presence of an abstract construct… is to demonstrate that [it] has measur-
able effects that are highly correlated’ (Feldman Barrett 2006, 33). In our case, if psycho-
pathy is a natural kind, its measurable behavioural, affective and interpersonal traits
should highly correlate and form a taxon (Skeem et al. 2011, 101–102).
Although some authors have argued that psychopathy is a taxon, specifically, that it
delineates a category of people characterised by severe dispositions towards antisocial
behaviour (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey 1994; Harris et al. 2007), there are more studies indi-
cating that psychopathy is not a discrete category (Walters et al. 2011). For instance,
studies on youth and adults have indicated that psychopathic traits are best construed
as dimensional, in the sense that they may be differently pronounced across individuals
in the general population, and do not comprise a separate category (Edens et al. 2006,
2011; Murrie et al. 2007). Thus, studies indicate that differences between psychopaths
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and non-psychopaths ‘reflect differences in degree rather than differences in kind’ (Edens,
Marcus, and Vaughn 2011, 22).4
Other studies indicate that PCL-R’s Factors 1 and 2 are moderately correlated (r≈ .5)
(Skeem et al. 2011, 101). This gives us a significant probability of finding the co-instantia-
tion of Factor 1 and Factor 2 traits and provides evidence that psychopathy might denote a
stable cluster of properties. This is not surprising, since PCL-R was devised to delineate
individuals with affective and interpersonal abnormalities within the forensic populations
that are characterised by antisocial traits as captured by Factor 2 (Hare 2003). However,
this also limits its inductive power, because it does not guarantee that these two subsets
of psychopathy traits will be reliably co-instantiated in general populations. In fact,
researchers indicate that it is likely that affective (e.g. unempathic) and interpersonal
traits (e.g. manipulative/conning) can be exhibited without severe antisocial tendencies
(e.g. violent and impulsive behaviour; Cooke and Michie 2001).5
Nonetheless, it might be argued that psychometric features of PCL-R and its internal
reliability capture an SPC kind within the population of incarcerated criminals.6 We
might call this kind prison or criminal psychopaths. However, this suggestion faces the
problem of artificially reifying ‘prison psychopaths’ rather than capturing the explanatory
potent SPCs that characterise some people (for a discussion, see Jalava, Griffiths, and
Maraun 2015, appendix B).7 To avoid the illegitimate reification, this proposal should
be supplemented with data about how PCL-R correlates with external criteria. Impor-
tantly, this includes checking how PCL-R relates to psychometric features of other
measures of psychopathy. But it also involves checking whether it predicts something
non-trivial and informative about people classified as psychopaths, such as, for instance,
their performance on different cognitive, neural and behavioural tasks (Malatesti and
McMillan 2014; Brazil 2015). We discuss the latter issue in the next subsections.
Thinking about other measures of psychopathy reminds us that although PCL-R is con-
sidered the ‘gold standard’ for measuring psychopathy, it should not be equated with it
(Cooke and Michie 2001). In fact, other measures of psychopathy do not provide evidence
for the claim that psychopathy is unitary enough to warrant inferences that underpin SPC
kinds. For instance, the psychometric studies of PPI indicate that psychopathy is best con-
strued as a ‘constellation of subtraits that are largely or entirely uncorrelated’ (Lilienfeld
2013). Specifically, an important meta-analysis showed that the Fearless/Dominance
factor is weakly correlated with other psychopathic traits as measured by PPI (Marcus,
Fulton, and Edens 2013). This is important, because FD includes traits ‘such as sensation
seeking, narcissism, functional impulsivity, instrumental aggression, and attenuated fear-
potentiated startle’ that are ‘theoretically relevant to [different conceptualizations of] psy-
chopathy’ (Lilienfeld 2013, 85). Thus, there is no converging evidence related to different
measures of psychopathy for thinking that psychopathy involves a highly correlated
cluster of affective, cognitive and behavioural traits.
Given these results, some authors question the supposition that drives psychopathy
research, namely, the idea that psychopathy denotes a syndrome or a highly correlated
property cluster (Lilienfeld 2013; Jalava, Griffiths, and Maraun 2015, 192–199). On this
view, psychopathy should be regarded as a differential set of traits, such as superficial
charm, lack of social anxiety, manipulativeness and disinhibition, which could be more
or less correlated and pronounced across individuals. Since people with some of these
traits would be seen as ‘the quintessential social chameleons and social deceivers’, they
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would force us ‘to be on the lookout for them’ (Lilienfeld 2013, 86). Some even claim that
psychopathy represents a mere instrument of social control of people that we perceive as
different from us (e.g. Mullen 2007). On these interpretations, what makes psychopathic
traits salient are our characteristic responses, rather than some specific unity underlying
these traits.
The lack of high statistical correlation in a measure of psychopathic traits does not
necessarily show that psychopathy is not a natural kind. Lack of unity at the level of cog-
nitive, affective and behavioural traits might indicate that an operationalisation of the con-
struct is not valid. For instance, if PPI’s and PCL-R’s items differently correlate with each
other and various other measures or experimental tasks, then it is possible that one or the
other is not a good measure of psychopathy. Here, the HPC approach to natural kinds
could provide a methodological guidance. If psychopathy is a natural kind, we expect to
find a set of underlying characteristic causes or mechanisms.8 As mentioned above,
some authors maintain that psychopathy is underpinned by a specific aetiology. In
what follows, we examine this suggestion.
4.2. The Grounding of Psychopathy
There are at least two research camps that conceptualise psychopathy as a syndrome
underpinned by a common cause. One set of accounts conceptualises psychopathy as
underpinned by affective deficits, while the other as involving more general cognitive or
information-processing deficits (Brazil and Cima 2016).
According to the affect-based accounts, psychopaths exhibit deficits in the ability to
experience and learn from affective stimuli, as exhibited, for instance, on instrumental
learning tasks. These tasks involve learning to associate affective valence of stimuli with
behavioural responses (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005). Evidence indicates that psycho-
paths abnormally form associations via fear conditioning. In general, studies suggest
that psychopaths have problems in recognising fearful and sad stimuli (e.g. related to
facial expressions), they show reduced levels of anxiety, startle reflex and other responses
to threatening stimuli (Patrick 1994).
These affective deficits prompted David Lykken (1995) to propose the Low Fear model
of psychopathy. According to this model, psychopathy is marked by a general deficit in
responding to fearful stimuli. Later developments of this model include James Blair and
colleague’s postulation of an impaired Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM; Blair,
Mitchell, and Blair 2005). These deficits in responding to affective stimuli could explain
why psychopaths engage in immoral and antisocial behaviour. For instance, deficits in
recognising sad and fearful cues might not activate VIM that in normal people inhibits
violent and aggressive behaviour. Also, deficits in recognising fearful stimuli might
explain why psychopaths do not learn from punishment and persevere in harmful behav-
iour despite its negative consequences.
However, fear-based models of psychopathy have been criticised as oversimplifying
affective deficits correlated with psychopathy (Brazil and Cima 2016, 212). Studies indicate
that fear is a multifaceted construct and that psychopaths might not be subjectively insen-
sitive to fearful stimuli that lead to punishment; instead, they might simply fail to detect
such information (for a review, see Hoppenbrouwers, Bulten, and Brazil 2016). Thus, Blair
(2005) has proposed a more general affect-based account of psychopathy, the so-called
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Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model. According to IES, ‘psychopathic behaviour is
driven by impairments in representing affective information, thus leading to disturbances
in specific associative learning processes’ (Brazil and Cima 2016, 215, emphasis added).
Some neurocognitive data support this view. It has been shown across studies that the
PCL-R scores correlate with abnormal functioning of brain regions that process affective
stimuli and underpin reinforcement learning. These include the amygdala, ventromedial
(VMPFC) and orbitofrontal (OFC) prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and larger
paralimbic area of the brain (Kiehl 2006; Blair 2008).
The information-processing accounts are based on the discovery that psychopaths’
behavioural and affective deficits are context-dependent, namely their manifestation
depends on the focusing of psychopaths’ attention. According to the Response Modulation
Hypothesis and its variants advanced by Joseph Newman and colleagues (e.g. Koenigs and
Newman 2013), functional deficits in psychopathy stem from a failure to reallocate atten-
tion from a salient cue that is in their focus, to a secondary cue, that is outside of their
focus, but might be relevant for successful accomplishment of a task. In addition,
Newman and colleagues have shown that deficits in reinforcement learning are exhibited
among psychopaths even when they are required to respond to neutral (non-emotional)
stimuli, indicating that the deficits are not restricted to affective stimuli. However, when
their attention is properly directed, abnormalities correlated with fear-potentiated
startle reflex, passive avoidance learning, emotion recognition, and the amygdala acti-
vation tend to disappear (e.g. Newman and Kosson 1986; Koenigs and Newman 2013;
Larson et al. 2013).
These two research paradigms are standardly presented as offering alternative causes of
the psychopathy syndrome (Hamilton, Racer, and Newman 2015). We do not adjudicate
between the two accounts. Both accounts are developed on an impressive amount of
research. However, we will indicate why the currently available evidential basis for
either of the accounts does not provide sufficient evidence for considering psychopathy
as a natural kind.
Most evidence for these accounts is based on the results from tasks that tap different
aspects of executive functions (EF; Koenigs and Newman 2013). EF refer to capacities
such as planning, attention, memory, response control and so on that underlie
decision-making. However, different studies gave inconsistent results regarding psycho-
paths’ performance on these tasks. A plausible explanation of the inconsistent results is
the fact that psychopathy is a constellation of loosely correlated traits, and thus not a
unified syndrome (Lilienfeld 2013).
The affect-based accounts mostly rely on evidence from psychopaths’ performance on
the so-called hot executive function tasks that tap brain structures that process motiva-
tionally salient stimuli (Maes and Brazil 2013). A paradigmatic example is the Iowa gam-
bling task, devised by Bechara and colleagues to test the Somatic Marker Theory (Bechara
et al. 1994; Damasio 1994). The idea is that people with normally functioning somatic
markers will spontaneously acquire affectively negative representations when making dis-
advantageous decisions and learn to associate positively valenced representations with the
advantageous decisions. Some studies indicated that psychopaths might have deficits in
affectively marking the relevant information (for a review, see Blair, Mitchell, and Blair
2005). However, other studies have failed to replicate these results on the Iowa gambling
task (Schmitt, Brinkley, and Newman 1999; Blair and Cipolotti 2000; Lösel and Schmucker
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 197
2004). Similar inconsistency or mixed results have been found in other studies that tap hot
EF via various classical or operant conditioning methods and those that used imaging
technology (e.g. Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, and Newman 2011, 2013; Larson et al. 2013).
Some of these incongruities can be explained by the attention-based accounts, such as
the response modulation hypothesis and its variants (Koenigs and Newman 2013). These
accounts predict situation-specific deficits in processing affective stimuli. Affective deficits
are expected when affective stimuli are not in psychopaths’ primary focus of attention.
However, the evidence for the attention-based accounts does not support the view that
psychopathy is a natural kind. Specifically, some studies have failed to confirm the predic-
tions of attention-based accounts related to psychopaths’ cognitive functioning (Zeier et al.
2012). Moreover, what might account for this limited predictability is the fact that atten-
tion moderates affective deficits only in primary psychopaths (Zeier, Maxwell, and
Newman 2009; see also Schultz et al. 2016). Primary psychopaths are those who score
high on PCL-R but show low anxiety traits. Alternatively, secondary psychopaths show
high anxiety traits. Thus, many proponents of the attention-based accounts accept the
view that psychopathy is not a unitary construct (Zeier, Maxwell, and Newman 2009,
2012; Schultz et al. 2016).
Furthermore, a more general explanation for the incongruity in the data is that
decision-making deficits differentially correlate with specific psychopathy traits. This
would be expected if ‘psychopathy’ denotes a loosely correlated set of features. This con-
tention seems to be confirmed across studies. For instance, Dean and colleagues (2013)
found that in a general population, risky decision-making on the Iowa gambling task is
significantly correlated with impulsive and volatile personal style, while it is not correlated
with the callous and unemotional personality traits. This indicates that psychopathy is not
a monolithic entity underpinned by a clearly discernible set of dysfunctional mechanisms.
Baskin-Sommers and colleagues (2015) provide more general evidence for the latter
hypothesis. On the supposition that psychopathy is not ‘a broad clinical syndrome’,
they investigated how psychopathy facets relate to executive function as measured by a
battery of EF tasks. The results show that the PCL-R Factor 1 is not significantly correlated
with EF, while Factor 2 is negatively correlated with EF performance. Specifically, the anti-
social facet of Factor 2 seems to be negatively correlated with EF performance. This indi-
cates that Factor 1 traits might have a different aetiology from Factor 2 traits (Baskin-
Sommers et al. 2015, 337). If our construct of psychopathy denotes a natural kind,
these results would be harder to explain. However, they are easily explained if psychopathy
is a dimensional constellation of traits with different causal histories that can be more or
less pronounced across individuals.
4.3. Neurobiological Markers of Psychopathy
It could be argued that the diagnostic biomarkers of psychopathy indicate the existence of
a unitary construct. Biomarkers include all objectively measurable factors, such as phys-
iological reactions, gene sequences, specific brain activation patterns, and so on, that
are used for detecting, diagnosing and predicting biologically normal and abnormal con-
ditions. Specifically, the EEG, PET scan, and fMRI studies found that psychopathy corre-
lates with abnormalities in the activity of brain areas, such as the ventromedial and
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orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex, parts of the anterior cortex, insula, amygdala and the func-
tional connections between them (e.g. Glenn and Raine 2014).
These findings prompted some researchers to speculate that there is ‘a diagnostic bio-
marker’ for psychopathy (Gregory et al. 2015, 154). However, biomarkers do not have a
high predictive value on their own; they need to be coupled with genetic and developmen-
tal data to provide explanatory and predictive amendments (Brazil 2015, 116). This com-
plicates the classification of psychopathy and arguably indicates a need to refine the
category.
For instance, there is evidence that the core psychopathic traits pertaining to affective
and interpersonal deficits are moderately to highly heritable (Viding et al. 2008; Glenn and
Raine 2014, 23). However, recent evidence indicates that the heritability of affective and
interpersonal traits of psychopathy explains specific brain patterns related to antisocial
and criminal behaviour via the mediation of specific environmental circumstances.
Kolla and colleagues (2013, 2014) discovered a significant interaction between antisocial
aspects of psychopathy and childhood physical abuse (CPA). Furthermore, Dargis and
colleagues (2017) indicate that the correlation between psychopathy and deficits in
reinforcement learning is moderated by CPA. These studies show that familiar correlates
of psychopathy, such as brain abnormalities, functional impairments and antisocial behav-
iour, are exacerbated by the environmental conditions. In that regard, the biomarkers of
psychopathy can only play explanatory and predictive roles on the background of this
interaction between the heritable psychopathic traits and adverse childhood conditions.
This point can be nicely illustrated with the case of neuroscientist James Fallon. Fallon
discovered that PET scan images of his brain show surprisingly similar activation patterns
with the brains of psychopathic criminals. This included a diminished activity in the cir-
cuitry between orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex and the amyg-
dala (Fallon 2013, ch. 3). Fallon and his family were not entirely surprised by the results.
From childhood, Fallon has shown callous, unempathic, manipulative traits and proneness
to risky behaviour. Nonetheless, he has not exhibited antisocial traits. For example, on
PCL-R, he scores high on Factor 1, but low on Factor 2 traits and on PPI, he scores
high on the FD traits. Quite the opposite from a typical psychopath, Fallon is a family
man and a successful and respected neuroscientist. Thus, if sole reliance on brain patterns
provided diagnostic biomarkers of psychopathy, then we would group together a dispara-
gingly different types of people. This category would have little explanatory and predictive
power, which would make psychopathy a poor candidate for a natural kind on any of the
proposed accounts.
It could be argued that Boyd’s HPC can accommodate these considerations. As men-
tioned in the introduction, HPC can countenance kinds that are underpinned by external
or extrinsic mechanisms including environmental factors. Thus, the claim could be that
psychopaths comprise a group of people who have characteristic biomarkers that are
underpinned by gene–environment interactions.9
However, this proposal will not apply to the current conceptualisation of psychopa-
thy. The reasons for this are related to the already noted heterogeneity and lack of con-
sistency between different measures of psychopathy and how they correlate with
external criteria, such as performance on different neuropsychological tasks and
measures of biocognitive functions. To illustrate, let us consider again studies that
utilise the distinction between primary and secondary psychopathy. The distinction
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itself (low/high anxiety) indicates a difference in biomarkers underpinning psychopathic
personality. Moreover, studies that utilise this distinction found differential neurocogni-
tive signatures between high- and low-anxious psychopaths (e.g. Zeier, Maxwell, and
Newman 2009; Koenigs, Kruepke, and Newman 2010; Schultz et al. 2016). To take
one important example, in a recent study, Schultz and colleagues (2016) indicate that
during classical fear conditioning, primary psychopaths show normal activation in the
dorsal cingulate cortex and reduced activation in the ventral cingulate cortex, while sec-
ondary psychopaths showed an inverse pattern of activation in those brain areas. This
indicates that the mechanisms underpinning fear conditioning, which according to
some accounts present a hallmark of psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005),
might be intact in primary psychopaths, but impaired in secondary psychopaths. In
effect, the differences in the brain activation and performance of primary and secondary
psychopaths on various cognitive and conditioning tasks ground different predictions
and explanations of their cognitive, affective and behavioural capacities. Moreover,
they indicate that strategies for controlling such behaviour and designing therapies
for remedying these abnormalities should be different, depending on the underpinning
impairments or abnormalities (Brazil et al. 2016). Thus, these results provide evidence
that psychopathy as measured by PCL-R and other tools is not best construed as a
natural kind on the HPC family of accounts.
5. What to Do with Psychopathy? Some Methodological Remarks
Our discussion supports the so-called clutter hypothesis about the construct of psychopa-
thy. According to Matteo Mameli, a construct is ‘cluttered’ when it ‘conflates different
properties, properties that, according to our current best theories, need to be kept distinct’
(Mameli 2008, 720). To use a well-known example, once it was thought that jade was a
natural kind. Now we know that ‘jade’ refers to two microstructurally different kinds of
things (jadeite and nephrite) whose different properties warrant different inferences
about their instances. Mameli introduces the clutter hypothesis in relation to the
concept of innateness which seems to conflate properties such as being a genetically
coded Darwinian adaptation, having a flat norm of reaction, being universal within a
species, and so on. A general problem with such heterogeneous constructs is that they
may ground incompatible inferences and classifications (Mameli 2008, 731–732).
As the reviewed research indicates, psychopathy has different aetiologies and biocognitive
correlates and it is even differently conceptualised and measured across different research
groups (Brazil et al. 2016). When a research domain contains a ‘cluttered’ construct, it
would benefit from introducing some changes related to that construct (Mameli 2008).
Some authors agree that this point applies to the psychopathy research (Brazil et al.
2016). In general, however, it is not immediately clear what needs to be changed.
In what follows, we consider three possible responses to the general results of our dis-
cussion. First, we might revise the category of psychopathy. Second, and perhaps following
from the first response, the current category ought to be eliminated due to aforementioned
difficulties associated with it. Third, it could be argued that although psychopathy is not a
kind on cluster approaches, there are more suitable accounts of kinds in the biomedical
sciences that should replace the cluster approaches and that can countenance psychopathy
as a kind. We start with the third response.
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5.1. Revising the Account of Kinds
Recently, some authors have analogously to our discussion argued that autism is not an HPC
kind (for a review, seeWeiskopf 2017). In response to these considerations, Daniel Weiskopf
(2017) argues that autism should not be judged by the HPC or similar criteria. According to
him, autism is a heterogeneous kind best captured by a network model of kinds. In a net-
worked category, one starts with a set of idealised exemplars grounded on individual
cases that form a clinical profile. The exemplars form a network by sharing at least one
theoretically significant property with exemplars from other sets.10 The significant property
might refer to biomarkers, behavioural dispositions, functional and cognitive profiles, and so
on. Similarly, it could be argued that we should not apply the natural kind framework to
psychopathy, rather we should conceptualise the category in some other way.
Without entering into debate on the specific case of autism classification, we take it that
Weiskopf’s approach, if it pertains to displacing natural kinds altogether from the biome-
dical sciences, is not a promising strategy in general, and more specifically in the case of
psychopathy. We provide three interrelated considerations why abandoning the standard
natural kind framework is not a promising strategy for handling psychopathy.
First, the function of kinds in the biomedical sciences is to provide us with explanatory
and predictive information that grounds control and effective treatments. Cluster
approaches pertain to accommodate this function. Alternative accounts either capture
these explanatory and predictive relations or they do not. If not, they lack something
important as accounts of categories in the biomedical sciences; namely, they do not
capture relations that ground knowledge necessary for effective control and treatment.
If they capture these relations, then they will not advance the current debate because psy-
chopathy will likely not be a kind for the already presented reasons.
Second, as mentioned above, important goals in the biomedical sciences involve creat-
ing categories that facilitate successful diagnosis and prediction of pathological processes
and designing therapies for curing them. However, the scientific research on psychopathy
and ASPD more generally has not been successful in designing effective therapies (Brazil
et al. 2016). Given this stage of the current research, it is unlikely that abandoning the
natural kind framework and revising the account of kinds in order to countenance psycho-
pathy as it is currently conceptualised will improve the prospects of designing better thera-
pies. This leads us to the third point.
Philosophical accounts of natural kinds should not just accommodate and describe cur-
rently used scientific categorisations; they should also provide a normative framework for
judging what counts as a natural kind and when a category should be revised or eliminated
(Kendler, Zachar, and Craver 2011). Otherwise, we run the risk of legitimising current
classifications, even when they hinder scientific progress. Property cluster approaches
provide a framework for avoiding such illegitimate conservatism. These three consider-
ations indicate that the psychopathy research might be improved by revising the category
of psychopathy, rather than abandoning the natural kind framework.
5.2. Revising the Category of Psychopathy
In the literature, there are some indications how the constructs of psychopathy and ASPD
could be revised into finer grained types. As already discussed, some authors propose to
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distinguish between primary and secondary psychopathy. There are different but inter-
related dimensions along which authors propose to introduce this distinction (Yildrim
and Derksen 2015). As mentioned, often the distinction is made in terms of levels of
anxiety. Different levels of anxiety might reflect differences in aetiology (Schultz et al.
2016). For instance, Benjamin Karpman (1941) speculated that primary psychopaths
have an inherited affective deficit while secondary psychopaths have an acquired affective
disturbance (see also Skeem et al. 2003). There is even some evolutionary evidence sup-
porting this distinction. Affective and interpersonal (Factor 1) traits seem to be positively
correlated with reproductive success among psychopathic offenders, indicating that these
traits might be heritable because they play a protective role for people growing up in
adverse environments (Međedović et al. 2017). Nonetheless, research shows that the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary psychopaths can be made along different neurop-
sychological and behavioural dimensions and that further subtypes can be distinguished
within these posited categories (for a review, see Yildrim and Derksen 2015). Thus, the
usefulness of this distinction and its validity should be further evaluated by future research.
Other authors argue that for practical and theoretical reasons, we should distinguish
between successful and unsuccessful psychopaths (e.g. Sifferd and Hirstein 2013).
Researchers are still not clear on how exactly to conceptualise the distinction (for a
review, see Smith, Watts, and Lilienfeld 2014). However, there is a broad understanding
that successful psychopaths would be intelligent individuals displaying abnormal affective
and interpersonal traits (Factor 1), but with no or little history of violent behaviour and
incarceration. The unsuccessful psychopaths would be those who also display the anti-
social and impulsive traits (Factor 2). However, the construct of successful psychopathy
and its measurement are still not validated, and many claims about the existence of suc-
cessful psychopaths who have superior cognitive skills seem to rest on dubious studies
(Maes and Brazil 2013; Jurjako and Malatesti 2016).
However, if ‘psychopathy’ designates a loose set of traits that do not form a reliable and
stable cluster, as seems to be suggested by Lilienfeld (2013), then the prospects of disco-
vering subtypes that would be analogous to the case of jade are not promising. In that
case, psychopathy research could benefit from a more radical revision. Given that there
is no consensus on what are the core psychopathic traits and how to measure them and
that we have no effective therapies for the most severe forms of ASPDs, Inti Brazil and
colleagues (2016) suggest to reconceptualise all antisocial personality types along the
lines of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. The National Institute of Health
proposed RDoC as a way of reconceptualising the classification of mental disorders
(Insel et al. 2010). RDoC conceptualises mental disorders as dysfunctions in the brain cir-
cuits and relies on genetic and other neuroscientific data to provide biocognitive markers
for diagnosing and classifying disorders (Insel et al. 2010; see also Murphy 2017).
This way of classifying might be fruitfully applied to psychopathic and antisocial behav-
iour. The reviewed studies indicate that different factors cause or correlate with antisocial
behaviour, including psychopathy. The neurocognitive biomarkers, including the herit-
ability of some psychopathic traits, might delineate novel specific groupings within the
broader category of ASPD. When these biomarkers are coupled with information about
the early developmental environment and other relevant factors, they may provide reliable
information about different subtypes of people exhibiting severe forms of antisocial behav-
iour and the causes or mechanisms underpinning that behaviour. The suggestion of Brazil
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et al. (2016) offers an alternative way of categorising that would not depend on different
and historically contingent folk-psychologically defined measures of psychopathy. Fur-
thermore, this information about developmental and biological markers of psychopathy
and ASPD might be used for developing more focused and effective treatments for
people with extreme forms of ASPD (Brazil et al. 2016). This bottom-up reconceptualisa-
tion could be an alternative way of unravelling the natural kind that our construct of psy-
chopathy might be gesturing at.
Reorientation to bottom-up research, however, might suggest the elimination of the
construct of psychopathy. This brings us to the first proposed response—to eliminate
the category. Although we leave open that in future the construct of psychopathy will
become theoretically and/or practically obsolete, we maintain that this is still not the
case. In the next section, we indicate how we think the role of ‘psychopathy’ should be
construed in the current research.
6. Psychopathy as a Pragmatic Kind
Although the clutter hypothesis seems to apply to the construct of psychopathy, it does not
follow that the category is entirely practically or theoretically useless (but see Blackburn
1988). For instance, Mameli thinks that the clutter hypothesis is true of Newton’s
concept of mass, since it conflates rest mass and relativistic mass (Mameli 2008, 730).
However, since they simplify calculations, Newton’s concept of mass and equations that
define it are still useful for some purposes, such as building bridges. Albeit relevantly
different from the concept of mass, we maintain that psychopathy as currently used is
useful for some research purposes and thus, should not be eliminated.
We maintain that a category is minimally useful, and thus a pragmatic kind, when it
focuses research by facilitating communication and prediction in some domain.11 Psycho-
pathy satisfies these conditions in some research domains. For instance, psychopathy, at
least as characterised by PCL-R, reliably predicts recidivism and violent behaviour
(Hare 2003).12 Thus, it plays an important practical role in legal and clinical contexts
where it is often important to predict dangerousness of a person (Malatesti and McMillan
2014; Brzović et al. 2016). Furthermore, in forensic research, it informatively carves up a
subgroup of people with ASPDs. For instance, studies indicate that people with ASPD
comprise 50% of prison populations across countries (Fazel and Danesh 2002), while
only 20% of those populations is considered psychopathic (Hare 2003). Thus, psychopathy
narrows down the scientific focus to groups of people within the broader category of
ASPD. Also, psychopathy has an important communicative role in forensic and clinical
research. Many of the most important discoveries regarding psychopathy were found
after the standardisation of assessment procedures such as PCL-R. There is an impressive
body of information stemming from the neuropsychological research on psychopathy
which might be lost if we discard ‘psychopathy’. We think that these considerations
qualify psychopathy as an important pragmatic kind.
The concept of a pragmatic kind, as we construe it here, is useful to accommodate situ-
ations where a category cannot be considered a natural kind, but it serves useful investigative
purposes at least until a better alternative becomes available. Most scientific categories are
introduced as pragmatic kinds in this sense. Take the concept of a gene, for example. It
was introduced as a vague notion of a unit of inheritance. Nonetheless, it serves a unifying
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role in scientific research that enabled discoveries of mechanisms underpinning genetic
material and its causal roles (Rheinberger 1997). Thus, while theoretically ‘gene’ refers to
a wide and heterogeneous class, for practical purposes, it is still useful.13
This approach to psychopathy seems to be vindicated by the Triarchic model of psy-
chopathy. Recently, Patrick, Fowles, and Krueger (2009, 913) have proposed the Triarchic
model as ‘a framework for coordinating research on neurobiological and developmental
processes contributing to varying manifestations of’ psychopathy. This model is based
on a review of different historical and contemporary conceptualisations of psychopathy.
It integrates competing and inconsistent conceptualisations and empirical results by con-
ceptualising psychopathy as comprised of three broad features that have different aetiol-
ogies and can be more or less displayed across individuals. These include Disinhibition
(e.g. impulsiveness, control problems), Boldness (e.g. low reactivity to stress, high self-
assurance) and Meanness (e.g. exploitative and cruel behaviour; Patrick, Fowles, and
Krueger 2009, 925–926).
Wemaintain that the reviewed considerations qualify psychopathy as an important case of
a scientific category in the making, where a category, regardless of its deficiencies, serves to
guide further research. Thus, we think that according to the available research, psychopathy
should be construed as a pragmatic kind that underpins forensic and clinical research on
extreme forms of antisocial behaviour, at least until a better refined construct or some
other theoretically and practically more useful concept replaces it. Indeed, we expect the cat-
egory to be revised and refined in future research for at least one important reason. As men-
tioned in section 5, currently, there is no effective (cognitive, behavioural or pharmacological)
therapy for reducing the maladaptive features of psychopathy (Brazil et al. 2016). This is likely
due to the heterogeneity of psychopathy which underlines our argument that psychopathy is
not a natural kind. We expect that a likely remedy for this important problem will include
revisions along the lines we discussed in the previous section.
7. Conclusion
We examined whether psychopathy can be considered a natural kind on the cluster
approaches. We argued that currently there is insufficient evidence to conclude that psy-
chopathy comprises a stable cluster of properties and, furthermore, that studies suggest
that psychopathy is not underpinned by a unified set of underlying mechanisms. Sub-
sequently, we considered implications of such results for the category of psychopathy.
Three options were examined: (1) revision of the category; (2) elimination of the category
and (3) abandoning the cluster approach to natural kinds. Against (3), we argued that the
cluster approach to psychopathy categorisation should not be abandoned. In our view, the
scientific, forensic and clinical practice would benefit from the revision of the psychopathy
construct. However, we maintain that this does not imply that the construct should be
eliminated because it still plays useful roles in framing research. To distinguish its
current status from categories that designate natural kinds, we propose to construe ‘psy-
chopathy’ as a pragmatic kind.
Notes
1. In Table 1, item numbers denote their original sequence in the PCL-R manual.
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2. Since the number of psychopaths in the European prisons is smaller, the cut-off line of 25
provides the equivalent psychometric features as the score 30 in North America (Cooke
and Michie 1999; but see Hare 2003, 30).
3. However, there are versions of PCL devised for younger populations (PCL-Y) and for
research in non-institutional settings (PCL-screening version) (Hare 2003).
4. This is not surprising since studies indicate that most disorders exhibit a dimensional and
thus non-taxonic structure (Haslam, Holland, and Kuppens 2012).
5. A nice example of this dissociation between Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores is provided by the
case of Dr. Fallon. See section 4.3.
6. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to explicitly address this issue.
7. Interestingly, given the problem of reification, some researchers informally call psychopaths
identified by PCL-R as Bob Hare’s psychopaths.
8. This characterisation of HPC might imply that all members of the kind psychopathy need to
share common causes responsible for their shared properties. An anonymous reviewer
rightly points out that this is not necessarily Boyd’s view, although this seems to be a
common interpretation of his account (Slater 2015). Arguably, Boyd’s view is compatible
with Slater’s stable property cluster account. In fact, Slater (2015) accepts the possibility
that his view represents only a minor revision to Boyd’s account. However, in the present
context, the correct interpretation of Boyd’s view is non-essential. We only emphasise the
fact that there are important differences between these two views (or interpretations of
Boyd’s account) that have practical consequences for identifying psychiatric and forensic cat-
egories such as psychopathy.
9. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
10. This view of kinds should not be confused with a more familiar network theory of mental
disorder (Borsboom 2017). This theory requires stable clustering of causally self-sustaining
symptoms to determine a disorder. In this respect, it is compatible with clustering approaches
to kinds.
11. The term ‘pragmatic kinds’ originates in Philip Kitcher’s (2007; see also Zachar 2002)
approach to natural kinds in general. He takes kinds to be those categories that best serve
the goals our community would endorse in an informed and educated democratic decision
process. We do not endorse such an approach to all scientific categories. However, we hold
that his strategy of weighing practical and epistemic considerations is suitable for the scien-
tific contexts where we still do not have well-established categories, but only certain open-
ended attempts, or categories in the making. In the main text, we explain how these consider-
ations apply to the current stage of psychopathy research.
12. However, the predictive power of PCL-R is mostly due to antisocial traits which psychopathy
shares with more general antisocial personality disorder (Wallinius et al. 2012).
13. Paul Griffiths (2004), following Ingo Brigandt (2003), uses the notion of investigative kinds to
capture similar ideas about some scientific categories (see also Rheinberger 1997). Brigandt
(2003) construes investigative kinds as scientific concepts in the ongoing research projects
whose intensions and extensions are altered through research to achieve greater explanatory
and predictive power. We do not adopt the term ‘investigative kind’ because Brigandt (2003,
1309–1310) seems to construe it as a category that loses its purpose once discovered that its
instances do not share an underlying mechanism or a structural property. Thus, ‘investigative
kinds’ seem to be a terminological variant of natural or cluster kinds. Instead, we use the
concept of pragmatic kinds to delineate exactly those stages of scientific research where
the categories are not yet fully established or determinate but are useful in the ongoing
research.
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